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1391 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM 1952 
___________________________________________________________ 
BROWN, ET AL., 
PETITIONER, 
-V.- 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, 
KANSAS, 
RESPONDENT. 
___________________________________________________________ 
________________________ 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS 
________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
Counsel for Petitioner 
University of Southern California Law Center 
University Park 
Los Angeles, CA 90089 
 
 
 
                                                          
 * I want to thank Diidri Wells for her excellent research assistance. 
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I. STATE MANDATED SEGREGATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF 
 KANSAS DENIES AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in part 
that no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The 
Amendment was adopted to ensure that persons of color could enjoy 
the same civil rights enjoyed by white persons.  See Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (holding that excluding African 
American men from jury service on account of race violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Equal protection 
is not achieved through “indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.”  
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). 
A. In requiring segregation of the races in public schools, Kansas 
adopted a classification lacking any rational foundation.   
The legislature may make classifications in the application of a 
statute so long as the classifications are relevant to the legislative 
purpose.  See, e.g., Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 214 
(1945) (evaluating the constitutionality of a North Dakota statute that 
discriminated against corporate farmers).  The test to determine if a 
classification is reasonable is to examine “whether the differences 
between [the classes] are relevant to the subject for which the 
classification is made.”  Id. (citing Metropolitan Ins. Casualty Co. v. 
Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935)).  Equal protection is violated 
when racial classifications are irrelevant to the subject of the statute 
and the legislature’s actions are patently arbitrary and capricious.  See, 
e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (invalidating a city 
ordinance requiring laundries be located in brick or stone buildings 
because it discriminated against Chinese people without a valid 
purpose).  Although this Court has recognized the need for 
deference to legislative judgments, it has said that the judiciary may 
overturn legislative decisions when there is “no reasonable basis” for 
that body’s judgment.  See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
1. There is no legitimate justification for the state to mandate racial 
separation in education.  
The only valid justification the state of Kansas has to offer for 
segregated schools is that, sometimes, the educational interests of 
children are best served by having separate school facilities for white 
children and African American children.  However, the state offers 
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no evidence to support this contention.  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 661 (1870).  The 
differences between the races, whether physical or cultural, do not 
adversely affect the quality of a child’s education.  In fact, 
desegregation could actually promote friendly relations between the 
races, especially when the segregation is eliminated from all schools 
within a school system simultaneously.  See generally Ralph D. Minard, 
Race Relationships in the Pocahontas Coal Field, 8 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 29, 31-
32 (1952) (observing improved race relations among integrated coal 
miners).  Over time, as students of different races interact, 
stereotypes will end and attitudes with regard to race likely will 
change in society.  Because the differences between the races are 
irrelevant to the state’s goal of achieving optimal educational 
opportunities for children, the state-mandated segregation fails the 
reasonableness test noted in Asbury, 326 U.S. at 214.  Kansas’s 
decision to mandate segregation in public schools violates equal 
protection because it fails even the most deferential rational basis 
test. 
2. State-mandated racial separation is so arbitrary and irrational as 
to deny equal protection.  
The segregation of public schools by Kansas is irrelevant to the 
state’s purported goal of attaining ideal educational facilities and, 
therefore, equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
violated.  As noted in Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373, when government 
action is so irrelevant as to represent the epitome of arbitrariness and 
capriciousness, it is intolerable under the Constitution.  Rather than 
aiming to prevent racial discrimination, as in Railway Mail Ass’n v. 
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 97 (1945) (upholding a New York law forbidding 
an all-white labor union from discriminating on the basis of race), the 
imposition of segregation by Topeka’s Board of Education instead 
promotes racial stereotypes and is psychologically harmful to the 
students of color who are segregated.  See, e.g., Max Deutscher & 
Isador Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation:  A Survey of 
Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259, 274 (1948) (concluding that 
enforced segregation causes feelings of inferiority in the segregated 
group and a feeling of dominance by the enforcing group).  
Segregation is so irrational as to deny equal protection, and hence 
the practice should be declared unconstitutional. 
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B. State-mandated segregation of public education is impermissible 
discrimination based on race and thus a violation of equal protection.  
1. The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
eliminate state-mandated discrimination based on race.  
a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that it was 
intended to eliminate state-imposed invidious discrimination based on 
race, particularly against African Americans. 
As stated in Strauder, the Fourteenth Amendment is a declaration 
that “the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the 
white;” that all persons shall “stand equal before the laws of the 
States,” and that no discrimination by law shall be made against 
African Americans simply because of the color of their skin.  100 U.S. 
at 307.  The Amendment was adopted to prevent state legislation 
designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race.  See id. at 
306 (stating that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
“secure to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many 
generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the 
superior race enjoy.”); Ry. Mail Ass’n, 326 U.S. at 94 (stating that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was “adopted to prevent state legislation 
designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color”).  
The main objective was to place African Americans on the same level 
as whites, especially with respect to the enjoyment of civil rights.  See 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (holding that African 
American defendants are entitled to a jury selected without 
discrimination against members of their race).  This Court 
consistently has held that the right to equal protection of the laws is 
both a personal and a private right, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
precludes the state from treating its citizens differently just because of 
their race.  See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635; McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950). 
The underlying principles that dictated the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment mandate that racial segregation in public 
education be banned because the practice denies African American 
students equal protection of the laws.  As noted in Railway Mail Ass’n, 
history indicates that the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to prevent 
government actions that perpetuated discrimination.  326 U.S. at 94.  
If this Court were to uphold Kansas’s discriminatory segregation 
practices, it would be in blatant disregard for the principles of 
equality that the Constitution aims to uphold. 
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b) This Court has held that government laws based on race are 
“immediately suspect” and will be subjected to “the most rigid scrutiny.”  
Korematsu v. United States establishes that any government action 
that impinges on the civil rights of a single racial group is 
immediately suspect.  323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).  Although all such 
actions are not necessarily unconstitutional (e.g. in cases of pressing 
public necessity), racial antagonism can never be the driving 
motivation behind a suspect classification.  Id. 
The imposition of racial segregation in public schools by Topeka’s 
Board of Education is immediately suspect because it is a government 
action based solely on race.  The state’s purported goal of attaining 
the most ideal educational facilities is not so pressing a need as to 
outweigh the discriminatory effect of segregation.  The practice of 
separating children simply because of the color of their skin is pure 
racial antagonism at its worst, and this Court should rule to eliminate 
it. 
2. State-mandated racial segregation in education is an 
impermissible form of racial discrimination that violates equal 
protection.  
In recent years, this Court consistently has held that the state may 
not impose restrictions in fields of government activity based solely 
on race.  See, e.g., Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635; McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642; 
Sipuel v. Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948).  In Sweatt, the 
petitioner sought to compel his admission into the University of 
Texas Law School, which had denied him admission solely because 
he was African American.  339 U.S. at 631.  Despite choosing not to 
reexamine the holding of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the 
Court, in granting relief to the petitioner, declined to rule for 
respondents and refused to extend the “separate but equal” doctrine 
of Plessy to racial segregation in education.  Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36.  
The Court found that the separate law school facilities provided to 
African American students in no way provided the same 
opportunities as did the University of Texas Law School.  Id. at 635.  
Moreover, the Court characterized the right to a quality education as 
a “personal right” entitled to full equal protection of the law.  Id. 
In a parallel case, McLaurin, this Court ruled that, although the 
petitioner was admitted into the University of Oklahoma’s Doctorate 
in Education program, the fact that he was required to sit in a 
separate row in the classroom, eat at a separate table in the cafeteria, 
and study in a different section of the library, constituted a violation 
of equal protection.  339 U.S. at 640-41.  Even though the ruling did 
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not guarantee the elimination of prejudices, by allowing the 
petitioner to commingle with his classmates it at least gave the 
petitioner the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students 
on his own merits.  Id. at 641-42. 
Similarly in Sipuel, this Court found that because petitioner, an 
African American student, was denied admission into law school 
simply as a result of her race, the state must provide her with a legal 
education in conformity with the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  332 U.S. at 633. 
a) The schools in Kansas are both separate and unequal and thus a 
denial of equal protection. 
It is simply illogical to argue that the segregated Kansas public 
schools can be separate but equal.  Inequality is promoted when 
school children are separated.  The majority race will maintain a 
natural sense of superiority by the mere separation of educational 
facilities.  See generally Deutscher & Chein, supra, at 274 (describing 
racial prejudice as a means to support feelings of dominance).  
Further, as noted in Sweatt, the educational opportunities provided to 
African American students in separate facilities would not be 
equivalent to those afforded to white students.  339 U.S. at 634.  
Therefore, the separate facilities violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
not just because they are unequal, but also because separate schools 
in general, whether equal or not, promote the same prejudices and 
stereotypes that the amendment was adopted to prevent. 
b) The state’s purpose in mandating racial segregation of education in 
public schools is to protect white children from association with African 
American children.  This is an impermissible purpose under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In McLaurin, although the African American petitioner attended 
the same graduate school as the white students, this Court still ruled 
that requiring the petitioner to sit in a separate row, eat at a separate 
table, and study in a separate area was impermissible under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  339 U.S. at 642.  If racial separation within 
the one school is impermissible, then certainly separation by way of 
separate schools is constitutionally intolerable.  As in Sipuel, the 
petitioners in the instant case are being denied admission into a 
school solely because of their race.  332 U.S. at 632.  Accordingly, this 
constitutes a violation of equal protection and hence this Court 
should eliminate racial segregation in public schools. 
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C. This Court’s prior decision in Plessy should be overruled. 
More than fifty years ago, Plessy ruled that separate but equal 
railway train cars for whites and African Americans was 
constitutionally permissible.  163 U.S. at 548.  However, in Sweatt, this 
Court declined to extend the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy 
to the context of educational facilities.  339 U.S. at 635-36.  In so 
ruling, the Sweatt Court noted that equivalent educational 
opportunities in a separate facility were unavailable, so the doctrine 
of Plessy was impossible to achieve.  Id.  McLaurin also shows that the 
“separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy is unattainable, because 
separation promotes racial prejudices and can impose a sense of 
inferiority on the African American race.  339 U.S. at 641-42. 
Further, even if segregated schools could provide equal facilities, a 
sense of equality among the different races would still not pervade.  
As noted in McLaurin, separation itself denies equal protection of the 
laws, and promotes a distorted sense of superiority among white 
students and a sense of inferiority among African American students.  
Id.  To continue to uphold the “separate but equal” doctrine would 
be to continue to promote the same racist ideals that persisted during 
the period when slavery was legal.  Therefore, Plessy should be 
overruled. 
II. THE REMEDY MUST BE FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE 
STATE LAWS MANDATING SEGREGATION IN EDUCATION 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ORDER IMMEDIATE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REMEDIES TO ENSURE 
DESEGREGATION OF SCHOOLS AND EQUALITY OF 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY. 
A. Merely ordering equalization of resources in white and African 
American schools fails to meet the requirement of equal protection.  
1. History shows that resources never will be equal in white and 
black schools.  Only a unitary system of education will provide equal 
resources for white and black children.  
Recent cases that have come before this Court addressing separate 
educational facilities for white and African American students have 
not found the African American schools to be the equivalent of the 
white schools. See, e.g., Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36; McLaurin, 339 U.S. 
at 642.  Additionally, studies of children show that separate 
educational facilities do not provide equal resources for white and 
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black children.  See generally Isador Chein, What Are the Psychological 
Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT’L J. 
OPINION & ATTITUDE RESEARCH 229, 229 (1949) (noting the 
difficulty in studying segregated equal facilities because none could 
be found).  If equality cannot be obtained through separate facilities, 
then the State should abandon the concept of separate but equal, 
and this Court should require that only unitary schools be instituted. 
2. Even if resources were equal, state-mandated segregation denies 
equal protection because it is inherently based on an impermissible 
assumption, and transmits an impermissible message, that one race is 
superior to another.  
This Court’s ruling in McLaurin shows that even when segregation 
is used within a classroom, cafeteria or library, notions of prejudice 
are still promoted.  339 U.S. at 641.  Therefore, even when the 
resources being used are equal, if a segregated practice is still used, 
then a sense of inferiority will continue to be pervasive.  For this 
reason, segregation should be banned. 
3. Even if resources were equal, state-mandated segregation denies 
equal protection because psychological and sociological studies 
demonstrate that enforced racial separation interferes with the 
education of African American children.  State-mandated racial 
segregation interferes with the educational and mental development 
of African American children.  
As the lower court found, “State-imposed segregation in education 
itself results in the Negro children as a class, receiving educational 
opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to 
white children otherwise similarly situated.”  Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 
862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952).  In light of this finding of fact, equalization 
of tangible resources would be inadequate. 
As noted by Minard, when only some institutions are integrated 
and others remain segregated, whites still classify blacks as inferior. 
Minard, supra, at 32.  However, when integration is instituted across 
the board, there is an increased likelihood of friendly relations 
between the races.  Id. at 31-32.  Moreover, studies still maintain that 
segregation is psychologically detrimental to members of the 
segregated group.  Deutscher & Chein, supra, at 268.  Therefore, this 
Court should eliminate the promotion of inferiority and rule that 
racial segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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B. The appropriate remedy must be for this Court to: 
1. Declare unconstitutional the state law mandating racial 
segregation in education.  
2. Remand the case for the federal district court to implement 
remedies to ensure the rapid desegregation of the public schools 
using techniques such as redrawing attendance districts, reassigning 
students and teachers, busing of students, and all other needed 
means.  
3. Require the immediate equalization of resources expended on 
education for all children, as measured by per pupil expenditures, 
class size, and other tangible measures of equal educational 
opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The time is long overdue for this Court to eliminate state laws 
mandating segregation in education.  Such laws are based on exactly 
the racism and prejudice that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to eliminate.  This Court should 
declare that separate but equal has no place in American public 
education. 
